Introduction
Few subjects stimulate a more ferocious debate in Washington than the issue of how to deal with political Islam and whether the United States should engage with 'Islamist' movements. Whilst in the past these were largely considered to be academic questions, with little policy relevance, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 they have become central themes in discussions of US-Middle East and North African (MENA) relations. Notably, they are central to a debate that has all too often been conducted with a focus on what have been termed 'radical', 'extremist', 'nationalist' or 'Islamofascist' groups such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic government of Iran, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya (Hamas) in the Palestinian territories, or Hizbullah in Lebanon. That is to say that political Islam and the term 'Islamists' have often been conflated solely with groups that view violence as a legitimate recourse for their political grievances and the maintenance of power, but who articulate such methods with Islamic referents -terms, symbols, configurative emplotment 1 of events and actors -in their espoused ideological-discursive formations.
Problematically, placing such an emphatic emphasis on groups that have not renounced aggression has meant that the debate has often become cast in bifurcated terms, writing out what have been called 'grey zones', or 'moderate' Islamist groups that do not engage in violence (see Brown et al., 2006; Heydemann, 2007) . A serious consequence of this is that 'political Islam' is all too often represented as a homogenous monolithic structure of ideas; there is little discussion of what is better referred to as 'political Islam-s' and the hermeneutic diversity that is derived from interpreting the Koran, the Hadith and fatwas. As such the extent to which there is an ongoing political battle within political Islam (or rather between Islam-s) is often drowned out from public discourse (see Bulliet, 2002; Halliday, 2003; Sivan, 2003) .
Under such circumstances, the debate concerning how to deal with the various forms of political Islam, and engage with the Islamist groups that espouse them, is fraught with peril. The US debate's complexity is inextricably entwined with the politics of identity and fear as much as larger diplomatic and strategic concerns, such as combating terrorism, promoting democracy, stabilizing the MENA region, and peace building (Asseburg, 2007, p. 73) . However, that this complex issue is all too often dealt with parsimoniously is in and of itself an interesting phenomenon. This is especially the case in light of John L. Esposito's observation that:
Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists . . . US administrations and many European governments have often said that they distinguish between mainstream and extremist groups. However, more often than not, they have looked the other way when autocratic rulers in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere have intimidated and suppressed mainstream Islamist groups or attempted to reverse their success in elections in the past several decades. (Esposito, 2006, pp. 6-7) This chapter concurs with this observation, but seeks to generate a greater understanding of why this has been the case. Chiefly, this is done by putting forward a fairly simple argument: the distinctions between the diverse plethora of political Islam-s and Islamist groups have been obscured deliberately for the achievement of Washington's perceived national interests in the MENA region; or more boldly, this obfuscation is part of a larger exercise of power in which the US is seeking to dominate, restructure and have authority over the MENA. In this regard, to understand the US debate about engaging political Islam and promoting freedom and democracy requires a broader understanding of how successive administrations have understood America's global preponderance as inextricably linked to the geostrategic orientation of MENA regimes. It is this relationship that informs America's foreign policy elite when they construct policy towards the region, and it is therefore inseparable from any discussion of engaging regional actors inspired by political Islam.
